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Why is modern capitalism irresponsible and what would make it more responsible?  
A company law perspective 
Andrew Johnston and Lorraine Talbot1 
 
¶«WKHFRQFHSWRIFapitalism UHIHUVWR«a society that has made the amelioration 
of its collective living conditions and the realisation of its core value of personal 
freedom both dependent on and subservient to successful activation of the profit 
PRWLYHDQGWKHPD[LPLVDWLRQRIWKHUDWHRILQFUHDVHRILWVFDSLWDO·2 (Streeck 2016) 
 
Abstract 
We claim that capitalism is inherently irresponsible precisely because production and distribution to meet 
the needs of society is subordinated to profit maximisation. Historically, the corporate form enhanced that 
irresponsibility by accommodating rentier shareholders ² whose only concern is with the income generated 
by their shares ² by limiting their liability and by treating the company in law as separate from 
shareholders and their property, the fungible and fully transferable share. We show how this 
irresponsibility was somewhat countered in the post war period by government policy and an empowered 
and active labour movement, but re-emerged in the late 1970s when the economy could no longer support 
both rentier and labour interests. Since then, company law has enabled various financialised methods of 
increasing shareholder returns at the cost of innovation, productivity and returns to labour. We 
recommend policies to reform the company by reducing rentier-driven irresponsibility, particularly in the 
form of executive remuneration. We argue that existing responsible company forms such as the 
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Community Interest Company cannot create a more responsible capitalism while the limited liability 
company continues to provide substantial benefits to the alliance between rentiers and executives.  
 
Introduction 
Milton Friedman famously proclaimed that ¶D FRUSRUDWLRQ·V UHVSRQVLELOLW\ LV WR PDNH DV PXFK
money for the stockholders as possible.· )URP this we can surmise that, for Friedman, a 
responsible system of capitalism is one concerned only, or at least primarily, with profit 
maximisation. This is not the position we take here. We consider an economic system to be 
¶UHVSRQVLEOH· when it produces enough of the private goods people need to thrive, when it 
preserves enough of the public goods upon which all depend, and when it possesses mechanisms 
to distribute those goods equitably. Such a system is equipped to innovate and to meet future 
challenges. The question is: how do we get our economy to look like that? Like Streeck, we argue 
that the ability of a capitalist economy to operate responsibly is extremely limited, given that 
social goals are subordinated to the goal of profit maximisation. Without regulation and 
governance designed to ensure socially responsible outcomes, capitalism cannot be responsible 
because its driving force is profit, and it produces and innovates only to create more profit. 
Accordingly, capitalism only improves social and environmental conditions if this accidently 
coincides with profit maximisation. As a result, capitalism tends to generate negative social 
outcomes, and it has long been recognised that society must intervene to prevent social costs and 
ensure social benefits; a Polanyian double movement3 first evident in the political activities of 
workers and later embraced by reformers and government. This social taming of capitalism is, 
however, always a temporary fix because capitalism is a dynamic and changing social system 
prone to slip the noose of responsibility. Irresponsibility is endogenous to capitalism, and this 
tendency is particularly pronounced in modern, global corporate capitalism.   
There remains, however, a dominant strand of thought amongst business scholars (broadly 
defined) WKDW ¶UHVSRQVLEOH FDSLWDOLVP· LV D SROLWLFDO FKRLFH RQH WKDW ZDV PDGH LQ DOl major 
economies in the post war period, until systematically abandoned by the US and UK from the 
1980s, although continued (to varying degrees) in other economies. The varieties of capitalism 
literature typifies this reasoning as it attributes the creation of different kinds of capitalism to the 
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political choices of different states. 4  From this perspective, the German system of social 
democracy and codetermination is characterised as being the zenith of responsible capitalism, 
whilst neoliberal, financialised Anglo-American capitalism is its nadir.  
This is an attractive position for reformers as it presents a clear blueprint to create a more 
responsible form of capitalism. It makes political choice the means to improve welfare outcomes 
and to address inequality and environmental damage. However, we believe that this position is 
ahistorical and decouples politics from the dynamics of capitalism, thereby avoiding the more 
radical implications of creating a new, non-capitalist society. We recognise that even the 
significant reforms we suggest would not deal with the problems inherent in our economic 
system, although they may soften some of the most egregious inequalities and irrationalities 
which arise from corporate activities as currently governed. We recognise it will be very difficult 
WR ¶UHVSRQVLELOLVH·modern British capitalism and the company, given that the myopic drive for 
short-term shareholder value is accompanied low corporate profitability and an inflated equities 
market. So, the scene is set for even greater levels of irresponsibility unless radical reforms are 
undertaken in all areas of our social and economic life. This piece focuses on radical reform of 
the company. 
In taking this argument forward we begin by setting out a brief history of responsible capitalism 
and its (partial) demise. We then go on to examine how irresponsibility is integral to company 
ODZ H[DPLQLQJ WKH ULVH RI RXWVLGH DQG ¶LUUHVSRQVLEOH· LQYHVWRUs from the nineteenth century 
onwards and their role in establishing two key attributes of modern company law: separate 
corporate personality and limited liability. We examine how irresponsibility has been enhanced 
through company law, highlighting the increased focus on delivering shareholder value through 
mechanisms which have negative social and environmental impacts. We particularly focus on the 
governance mechanisms which have linked director rewards to shareholder value and strategies 
to advance both of these interests, such as share buybacks and increasing leverage. We argue that 
shareholder value-driven activities restrict long term investments in innovation, enable the 
¶VXSHU-H[SORLWDWLRQ·RIIRUHLJQZRUNHUVDQG harm the interests of domestic workers.  
In this paper we have limited ourselves to considering the irresponsibility which is perpetuated 
by the shareholder primacy orientation of companies. Our argument throughout is that business 
is currently driven almost exclusively by the expansion of private wealth, and this trajectory 
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enhances irresponsibility in capitalism. Thus, in the final sections, we examine reforms which 
would redress the enabling of capitalist irresponsibility through the corporate form. Such 
reforms would provide some resistance to the destructive impulse of capitalism. We then 
critically consider a company form which provides an alternative to shareholder primacy in that 
it deprioritises profit maximisation, protects assets and encourages stakeholder governance: the 
Community Interest Company. We ask whether alternative business forms can really encourage 
an alternative and responsible form of capitalism.   
 
II. The Rise and Fall of Responsible Capitalism : A Short History 
Responsibility is not integral to capitalism. Rather, it is a quality that arose from accumulative 
social and political changes ² not least the activities of collective labour ² and from resistance to 
the socially irresponsible attributes of capitalism. Responsible capitalism was achieved through 
political determination and it was achieved in the context of high economic growth.  
Thus, the notion that capitalism could and should be responsible is a relatively modern idea that 
only emerged in the post-war period. During the first half of the twentieth century, capitalism 
began to be strongly contested with the emergence of organised labour. As industrial unrest grew 
and the number of strikes increased,  the emergent corporate managerial class claimed that it 
could balance the conflicting interests of labour and capital, a position endorsed by the UK 
government during the reconstruction programme which followed the first world war.5 The first 
world war had damaged the authority of the ruling class and many disillusioned people in 
developed capitalist countries drew inspiration from the Russian revolution and its alternative to 
capitalism.6 Viewing management as an intermediary between capital and labour, charged with 
GHYHORSLQJ¶HVSULWGHFRUSV· held out the prospect of deflecting this challenge to the status quo. 
Labour could be appeased within the broad managerial discretion that already existed within 
company law, and, as shareholders were becoming increasingly dispersed, they could neither 
resist this nor impose demands on the directors of companies. In 1926, Keynes referred to this 
                                                          
5 Ministry of Reconstruction, Scientific Business Management, Reconstruction Problems 28, (HMSO 
1919). For further discussion of the emergence of this balancing ideology, see A Johnston,  ‘dŚĞ
^ŚƌŝŶŬŝŶŐ^ĐŽƉĞŽĨ^ZŝŶh<ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Washington and Lee Law Review 1001, 1011-
13. 
6 National Communist Parties were formed in a number of major countries from 1920 including the 
Communist Party of Great Britain.  The earlier writing of Rosa Luxemberg (Reform or Revolution and 
other Writings (1900)) as well as the writings of Trotsky and Lenin had massive impact at this time.  
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HPHUJHQFHRI ¶VHPL-VRFLDOLVP· LQ ¶VHPL-autonomous corporatioQV·DVa development which was 
probably preferable to control of industry through organs of central government.7 
The Wall Street crash and the ensuing economic depression of the 1930s further polarised global 
politics, with the systems of Stalinist Russia at one extreme and fascist Germany at the other. In 
the period leading up to the second world war, the British ruling elite were coming to terms with 
the inevitability of a transition from capitalism to socialism, should fascism not prevail. The 
diaries of the Russian Ambassador, Ivan Maisky, remind us of the pervasive resignation of the 
ruling establishment to a socialist Britain.8  
In the event, the British post war settlement saw the continuation of capitalism but with many 
radical changes and the expansion of social welfare; cradle to grave support for all, funded by 
taxes which were aimed at wealthier citizens and companies. The post war settlement between 
¶FDSLWDO· DQG a labour force, which now viewed itself as both morally entitled and politically 
strong, involved the construction of social institutions to protect citizens from the acknowledged 
endogenous instability and irresponsibility of capitalism.  It also removed essential industries, 
such as utilities, from the private sector in a massive nationalisation programme. The combined 
programme of social welfare and nationalisation of key industries became the compromise which 
sidestepped the widely-anticipated triumph of socialism.  
These compromises made it appear that making capitalism more responsible was solely a matter 
of sufficient political will.  However, the continuation of this compromise between labour and 
capital was only politically possible because of high growth in the post war period. High growth 
and profitability also enabled a relatively harmonious accommodation with the legally and 
politically empowered trade union movement, so that for an extended period, wages and job 
security improved substantially. 9  As Piketty shows, levels of inequality in society fell to 
unprecedented levels in the post war period. Measuring the ratio between income (all goods 
produced and distributed) and capital (all wealth which produces an income) to determine levels 
of inequality within society3LNHWW\·VDQDO\VLVshows that following World War II, high growth 
                                                          
7 :D<ĞǇŶĞƐ ? ‘dŚĞŶĚŽĨ>ĂŝƐƐĞǌ-&ĂŝƌĞ ? ?,ŽŐĂƌƚŚWƌĞƐƐ ? ? ? ? ?
8 G Gorodetsky, The Maisky Diaries: Red Ambassador to the Court of St James's, 1932-1943 (Yale 
University Press 2015)  
 
9 L Talbot,  ‘dƌǇŝŶŐƚŽŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞtŽƌůĚǁŝƚŚŽŵƉĂŶǇ>Ăǁ ?^ŽŵĞWƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Legal Studies 
513 
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levels led to a rise in income which resulted in a low ratio, indicative of reduced inequality. 10 This 
further helped with the rehabilitation of capitalism. It was now an economy that delivered wealth 
and equality.   
While profits stayed reasonably high, capital owners tolerated the increasing claims of labour, 
and, indeed the political climate made it difficult to do otherwise. This changed in the late 1960s 
as profits fell11 and cDSLWDORZQHUVEHFDPH LQFUHDVLQJO\ LQWROHUDQWRI ODERXU·V VKDUH, given their 
own reduced returns. At the same time, as we discuss in the next section, apparently technical 
reforms made to company law in the post war period enabled a resurgence of shareholder 
powers within companies, paving the way for the emergence of the hostile takeover and the 
(re)emergence of irresponsibility. Post-war responsible FDSLWDOLVPJDYHZD\WR)ULHGPDQ·VQRWLRQ
that responsible business was one which maximized profit for shareholders.  These neoliberal 
ideas found fertile ground in the context of a re-emergence of political conflict between trade 
unions and capital, with industrial unrest and strikes rife in the late 1960s and 1970s. The final 
flourish of social democratic governments in this period was an abortive move for industrial 
democracy, which proposed but never achieved employee-level board representation.12  The state 
became increasingly pro-business, culminating in the accession to power of the New Right 
Conservatives, with their own brand of neoliberalism, in 1979. They gradually weakened and 
then broke the power of the unions, increasing the share of national product distributed to 
capital (in the form of shareholders and executives) at the expense of labour. 13   Industrial 
democracy fell off the agenda. The New Right deregulated finance, empowering financial 
markets and so providing further fuel, in the form of leverage, for hostile takeovers during the 
1980s. The result was a stronger imperative to increase returns to shareholders, ideologically 
supported by pro-capital neoliberalism. Managers took advantage of globalisation to outsource 
many lower skilled jobs in search of cheap labour in developing countries, further reducing the 
                                                          
10 T Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Belknap 2014) 25-26 and 166-168 
11 M Roberts, The Long Depression (Haymarket Books 2016)  
12 The high point of this was the Bullock Report: see Department of Trade, Report of the Committee 
of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy (Cmnd 6706, 1977) 
13 So, while for much of the post war period labour in most developed countries claimed around 75% 
of the GNP, from 1980 labour share fell 0.3% each year so that by 2009 labour compensation of 
national income in the G20 countries had fallen to 61.7%: see K ? ‘dŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌ^ŚĂƌĞŝŶ' ? ?
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĞƐ ? ?ZĞƉŽƌƚƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ' ? ?ŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚtŽƌŬŝŶŐ'ƌŽƵƉŶƚĂůǇĂ ?dƵƌŬĞǇ ? ? ?-27 
February 2015 <https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/employment-and-social-policy/The-Labour-
Share-in-G20-Economies.pdf> accessed 8 May 2018  
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bargaining power of labour and its share of the national product. The resulting longer and more 
complex supply chains inevitably increased environmental irresponsibility, as the movement of 
components and products at various stages of completion massively increased global 
transportation.14  
From the early 1980s, as we set out in the next section, encouraged by changes to the taxation 
regime and later by soft law measures, and under pressure from institutional investors, 
companies increasingly adopted US-style, shareholder value remuneration practices for their 
senior executives. In the name of aligning director and shareholder interests, labour 
compensation for the top percentile earners (executives and the professionals who provided 
financial engineering and other services) massively increased. $V0LODQRYLF·V¶HOHSKDQW·JUDSKRI
global poverty shows, the incomes of the top 1% globally have risen 60% since 1988.15   
Britain was the first European country to adopt a neoliberal program, while others, principally, 
France with its state-led capitalism, and Germany with its corporatist system, continued in a 
more social democratic direction. These divergences in political choice were viewed as resulting 
in a more responsible capitalism, although both approaches have come under pressure both 
from the constitutional structure of the European Union, with its insistence on free movement 
of capital and freedom of establishment; from declining profitability; and from the encroachment 
of pro-shareholder value practices. Capital can no longer afford corporatism. Even the strongest 
social democratic states have reduced their commitment to welfare and high labour share. The 
Hartz IV reforms16 which radically reduced unemployment benefit in Germany, and various 
                                                          
14 ''ĞƌĞĨĨŝ ? ‘'ůŽďĂl value chains in a post-tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐǁŽƌůĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ZĞǀŝĞǁŽĨ
International Political Economy 9 
15 >ĂŬŶĞƌĂŶĚDŝůĂŶŽǀŝĐ ? ‘'ůŽďĂů/ŶĐŽŵĞŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ P&ƌŽŵƚŚĞ&ĂůůŽĨƚŚĞĞƌůŝŶtĂůůƚŽƚŚĞ'ƌĞĂƚ
ZĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?The World Bank Economic Review Advance Access published August 1, 21 
(covering the period from 1988 to 2010)  
16  ‘German labour-market reform: ,ĂƌƚǌĂŶĚŵŝŶĚƐ ? ?The Economist, (London, 29 December 2004), 
<http://www.economist.com/node/3522141> checked 8 May 2018 ?^ĞĞĂůƐŽKĚĞŶĚĂŚů ? ‘dŚĞ,Ăƌƚǌ
DǇƚŚ PůŽƐĞƌ>ŽŽŬĂƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ>ĂďŽƵƌDĂƌŬĞƚZĞĨŽƌŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĞŶƚƌĞĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶWŽůŝĐǇ
Reform, <http://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_german_labour_19.7.17.pdf> checked 8 May 
2018, 12 (Chart 11 showing trajectory of wages for different percentiles, with high wages continuing 
to grow, median wages stagnating and low wages falling, so that the intended wage restraint largely 
occurred in the bottom parts of the distribution) and 13 (discussing growth of outsourcing, and 
divide between insider TU members in core manufacturing and outsiders in service sector) 
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attempts to reduce labour rights in France17 are just some examples of this universal drift to a 
less responsible capitalism.  
 
III. How the Corporate Form Enhances Irresponsible Capitalism  
The limited liability company is the legal vehicle through which most capitalist production, 
accumulation and distribution of wealth occurs. From at least the 1980s, the corporate vehicle 
became central to the emergence of a dramatically less responsible capitalism, underpinned by a 
SUHGRPLQDQWIRFXVRQFUHDWLQJVKDUHKROGHUYDOXHZLWK¶FRUSRUDWHVRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\·UHOHJDWHG
to voluntary concessions that were consistent with the primary goal of profit maximisation. The 
notion of the company as a social institution contributing to the public good, which was never 
particularly strong in the UK, was lost entirely during this period. Under the influence of the 
burgeoning law and economics literature, policymakers equated returns to shareholders with 
increasing social wealth, and high share prices with a healthy economy.  
The company has many longstanding attributes, such as separate personality and limited liability, 
which ultimately enabled capital to reassert its interests over the claims of labour and citizens. 
However, the success of the corporate form in pursuing VKDUHKROGHUV·(short term) interests also 
rested upon key changes to company law and corporate governance which had the explicit aim 
of prioriWLVLQJ VKDUHKROGHUV· LQWHUHVW DQG FXUWDLOLQJ WKH SRZHU RI PDQDJHUV WR WDNH DFFRXQW RI
other interests.  
In this section, we first examine the origins of separate corporate personality and limited liability 
showing how they are premised upon, and in the case of limited liability were demanded by, 
investors who are inherently irresponsible. We then examine more recent changes in company 
law and governance to show how policymakers came to interpret WKHLQWHUHVWVRIWKHFRPSDQ\·V
shareholders as the sole goal of the company, to be pursued at the expense of other possible 
positive social outcomes.  
 
 
                                                          
17 A-^ŚĂƐƐĂŶǇ ? ‘PhiliƉƉĞƉƵƐŚĞƐĨŽƌƌĂƉŝĚĂĐƚŝŽŶŽŶ&ƌĞŶĐŚůĂďŽƵƌƌĞĨŽƌŵ ? ?&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůdŝŵĞƐ ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?
6 July 2017 <https://www.ft.com/content/b5f42cf4-4ac4-11e7-919a-1e14ce4af89b?mhq5j=e1> 
checked 8 May 2018 
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i. Enabling Irresponsible Ownership - Separate legal personality and limited liability 
The history of separate corporate personality and limited liability is pertinent to our discussion 
on irresponsibility because this is also the history of the rise and domination of the disconnected 
and irresponsible shareholder in whose interests the company is shaped. The history of the 
modern corporate form is the history of the rentier shareholder  
The history of separate corporate personality is one largely made in the courts, which had to 
GHWHUPLQH WKH OHJDO FRQVHTXHQFHV RI WKH ODZ·V FUHDWLRQ RI D FRUSRUDWH HQWLW\ 7KH FRXUWV·
decisions reflected their commercial awareness and understanding of the needs of the emergent 
rentier shareholder. In contrast, the history of limited liability is one of different and competing 
interest groups, and ultimately of legislation. However, while separate corporate personality and 
limited liability have distinct origins, they are conceptually intertwined and both underpin 
corporate irresponsibility.  
Registration of a business as a corporate entity was available as of right, albeit without limited 
liability, from the Companies Act 1844. This allowed for the long-term commitment of capital to 
the business,18 as well as ¶asset-partitioning·VKLHOGLQJWKHFRPSDQ\·Vassets from the creditors of 
its shareholders19), perpetual succession, the possibility of conferring benefits on employees and 
so on.20  However, it took many decades before the company and its shareholders were formally 
and conceptually separated. The company only emerged gradually as an entity distinct from its 
shareholders. This change can be followed through shifting conceptions of the nature of the 
property of the company and the proprietary rights attaching to shares. Published in 1888, 
Williston·VHarvard Law Review article argued that the separation of these two properties began 
with the case of Bligh v Brent in 1837 in which the long-standing understanding that shareholders 
were beneficiaries of the whole business was replaced by an assertion that their interests were as 
beneficial and legal owners of the surplus created by company assets, but not the assets 
themselves. 21  Over the following decades this became the general understanding of the 
                                                          
18 D ?ůĂŝƌ ? ‘>ŽĐŬŝŶŐŝŶĂƉŝƚĂů PtŚĂƚŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ>ĂǁĐŚŝĞǀĞĚĨŽƌƵƐŝŶĞƐƐKƌŐĂŶŝǌĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞ
EŝŶĞƚĞĞŶƚŚĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?UCLA Law Review 387 
19 ,,ĂŶƐŵĂŶŶĂŶĚZ<ƌĂĂŬŵĂŶ ? ‘dŚĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůZŽůĞŽĨKƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂů>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?zĂůĞ>Ăǁ
Journal 387 
20 DĂŶƐŽŶ ? ‘dŚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞWƌŝǀĂƚĞŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  >YZ ? ? ? ? ? 
21 S tŝůůŝƐƚŽŶ ? ‘,ŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞůĂǁŽĨďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞĨŽƌĞ ? ? ? ? PƉĂƌƚ// ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?,ĂƌǀĂƌĚ
Law Review 149 
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proprietary rights attaching to shares. The courts· shifting view of these rights reflected the 
increasing lack of responsibility on the part of shareholders, who became less like entrepreneurial 
owners, expressing interest in the intricacies of the business, and more like rentiers, interested 
only in revenue.22 $VFRPSDQLHVIDLOHGRUPHUJHGLQUHVSRQVHWRYDULRXVFULVHVZLWK¶ELJFDSLWDO
WDNLQJ RYHU VPDOO FDSLWDO· 23  shareholders with a purely external relationships to companies 
became the norm.24 By the end of the nineteenth century, the most accurate description of most 
shareholders was as owners of the revenue created by the company, but not the company itself, 
and who sought no involvement in the comSDQ\·VDFWLYLWLHV.  They had become rentier capitalists. 
Once shareholders were fully externalised the company became capable of being a distinct and 
separate entity, with its own powers and interests.25 
In contrast to the organic development of separate corporate personality, limited liability was 
introduced by legislation in 1855 as a result of a series of shifting alliances between different 
interest groups, and following considerable public controversy. But, like separate corporate 
personality, it was driven by the emerging rentier capitalist class. In the debate over limited 
liability the key conflict was between industrialists who had no need for limited liability because 
profits were high and risk was low, and pure investors, or rentiers, WKDW ¶ERG\RI capitalists not 
GLUHFWO\HQJDJHGLQWUDGHZKRZHUHQRZVHHNLQJDQRXWOHWZLWKSURILWIRUWKHLUDFFXPXODWLRQV·.26 
The latter ZHUH ¶WKH FKLHI LQVWLJDWRUV RI WKH OLPLWHG OLDELOLW\ OHJLVODWLRQ· 27  They had been 
consolidated as a class through the development RIUDLOZD\FRPSDQLHVDQG¶GHFLVLYHSUHVVXUHIRU
WKHLPPHGLDWHFKDQJHRIWKHODZFDPHIURPWKHQDUURZLQJRILQYHVWPHQWRXWOHWVLQWKHILIWLHV·DV
dividends from railways stagnated, as well as opposition to the risk of unlimited liability even for 
¶GRUPDQW partners· D ULVN PDGH SDUWLFXODUO\ VDOLHQW E\ WKH ZDYH RI MRLQW VWRFN EDQN IDLOXUHV
                                                          
22 K Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume III (first published 1894, Foreign 
Languages Publishing House 1962) 427 
23 K Marx, Capital: A Critical of Political Economy, Volume I (first published 1867, Foreign Languages 
Publishing House 1954) 626 
24 L Talbot, Progressive Corporate Governance for the 21st Century (Routledge 2012), Chapter 2 
25 P Ireland, I Grigg-^ƉĂůůĂŶĚ<ĞůůǇ ? ‘dŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨDŽĚĞƌŶŽŵƉĂŶǇ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
14(1) Journal of Law and Society 149 
26 JB Jefferys, 'Trends in Business Organisation ŝŶ'ƌĞĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƵŶƉƵblished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of London 1938) 34-41 
27 Jefferys, ibid 
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between 1846 and 1857.28 These investors did not view themselves as partners or proprietors; 
rather they were content to sit back, sign proxy forms and receive dividends, SUHIHUULQJ ¶D
UHPXQHUDWLYH LQYHVWPHQW UDWKHU WKDQ D SDUW VKDUH·29 Hence arguments were made that limited 
liability would facilitate the loan of money at a fluctuating rate just as the abolition of usury had 
facilitated lending at a fixed rate, and would reduce the excessive lending which had occurred 
under a system of unlimited liability.  
+RZHYHU WKH UHQWLHUV· VXFFHVV LQ getting limited liability into legislation was not the same as 
persuading manufactures to adopt limited liability or to organise their business to welcome 
outside investors. There was no dash to incorporate, and even when manufacturers did adopt the 
company form, they used mechanisms such as high denomination shares with large amounts of 
uncalled capital to provide the security for creditors they would have enjoyed with unlimited 
liability. 30 Taylor explains this by reference to ethical rejections of limited liability and ¶WKHDOPRVW
universal belief in the inherent superiority of priYDWHRYHUFRUSRUDWHHQWHUSULVH·31 However, it is 
much more likely that manufacturing (and other industries such as mining) did not seek outside 
investors because they simply did not need the capital. Profits were high and businesses were 
labour- rather than capital-intensive. Instead, it was increasing production costs, profit falls and 
crises which eventually broke the self-contained nature of industrial capitalists and gave rentier 
capitalists the investment openings they had been looking for.32 So with economic necessity 
aligned with legal opportunity, rentier shareholders, fully protected from company liabilities and 
possessing freely transferable shares, began to dominate from the end of the nineteenth century.  
                                                          
28 Jefferys ibid 47-8 and 50-1. 
29 :ĞĨĨĞƌǇƐŝďŝĚ ? ? ?DĐYƵĞĞŶĂůƐŽĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ŵŽƌĂů ?ĐůŝŵĂƚĞĞŶŐĞŶĚĞƌĞĚďǇƵŶůŝŵŝƚĞĚ
ůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚďǇŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝƐƚƐŚĂĚ ‘ĂĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞ human cost amongst smaller 
ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌƐ ?ǁŚŽ ‘ĨĂĐĞĚƚŚĞĞǀĞƌ-ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŚĞĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ:ĞĨĨĞƌǇƐ
ŝƐ ‘ĂƚďĞƐƚŽŶůǇƉĂƌƚŝĂůůǇĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?ĂŶĚƉŽŝŶƚƐƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞƌŽůĞĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ŽƌŵŽƌĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ?ƚŚĞ
Board of Trade, in advancing the legislation as a panacea to capital flight and as an incentive to 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ? PZDĐYƵĞĞŶ ?A Social History of Company Law (Ashgate 2009) 98-106.  
30 ::ĞĨĨĞƌǇƐ ‘dŚĞĞŶŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŽĨ^ŚĂƌĞƐ ? ? ? ?-1885 (1946) 16 Economic History 
Review 45, 46. 
31 J Taylor, Creating Capitalism: Joint Stock Enterprise in British Politics and Culture, 1800-1870 (Royal 
Historical Society Studies in History, Boydell & Brewer 2006) 17 
32 >dĂůďŽƚ ? ‘Legal Institutions: A Marxist-progressive Approach to the Modern ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶd-H J 
^ƵŶǇ ?>ŚĞƐƚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚ ?/ƉƉŽůŝƚŝ^ĂƉŝĞŶǌĂ ?ĞĚƐ ?Routledge Handbook of Heterodox Economics: 
Theorising, Analyzing and Transforming Capitalism (Routledge 2017) 
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Shareholders came to occupy a peculiar position. Treated in terms of liability in the same way as 
lenders, exposed to the insolvency of the separate entity only to the extent of their contribution, 
but treated as partners, just as the founding entrepreneurs had been under unlimited liability, 
when it came to questions of control.33 ¶2ZQHUV·ZLWKRXWUHVSRnsibility, but with some control 
rights, underpinned the emergence of modern capitalism. What was the significance of this for 
capitalism itself? Marx certainly thought it heralded a new period of destruction, division and 
inequality. 34 Progressives, such as Adolf Berle, believed that shareholders had lost their 
entitlements as owners since ownership necessarily entailed responsibility for the management of 
thing that was owned, and liability for any losses resulting from it.35 Shareholders had lost this 
responsibility with the separation of ownership from control and limited liability. Berle and 
Means reasoned that the new irresponsibility of shareholders potentially enabled those in control 
(managers) to guide companies towards becoming quasi-public institutions, less orientated 
towards making profit and focused on the interests of the community.  
That this would be the outcome of irresponsible ownership would depend on managers not 
aligning themselves with the interests of irresponsible shareholders and shareholders not 
becoming active and demanding. Neither happened.    
 
ii. The Binding of Corporate Decision-making to Irresponsible Ownership - Shareholder Empowerment 
and Alignment of Management and Shareholder Interests  
The drive for greater shareholder control over companies in law began in the 1940s and has 
continued apace, intensifying since the Global Financial Crisis.  
Since the Cadbury Report, shareholder empowerment has been consistently advanced as the 
solution to the repeated crises caused by (shareholder value) corporate governance. Where 
                                                          
33 In Welton v. Saffery [1897] AC 299 at 324, Lord Macnaghten, speaking of companies incorporated 
ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Đƚ ?ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ‘dŚĞƐĞĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐĂƌĞƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƐƚĂƚƵƚĞ ?ĂŶĚďǇƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƚĞƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ
they owe their being they must be bound in regard to shareholders as well as in regard to creditors 
in all matters coming within the conditions of the memorandum of association .... Shareholders are 
not partners for all purposes; they have not all the rights of partners; they have practically no voice 
ŝŶƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ? ? 
34 Marx, Volume III (n22) 430 
35 A Berle and G Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Harcourt, Brace and World 
1932) 
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corporate irresponsibility is admitted, it is ascribed to management, whilst shareholders, who are 
its primary beneficiaries, are assumed to inculcate a more long-term approach to management.36 
This remained the policy prescription in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, despite 
widespread recognition that shareholders played a key role in driving more risk-taking on the 
part of banks.37  
The decision to enhance the legal powers of shareholders was one of the key drivers of the 
irresponsible capitalism we witness today. Before 1947, and in line with their position as mere 
rentiers, shareholders had become peripheral, giving their proxies to the board and satisfied by 
regular dividends, 38   whilst the directors with broad management powers were strongly 
entrenched under the default articles (a 75% majority of shareholders was required to remove 
them), so they became self-perpetuating.39 The GHOLEHUDWHUHYHUVDORIWKLV¶QDWXUDO·40 development 
began with the Cohen CommittHH·V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQ LQWURGXFHG LQ WKH&RPSDQLHV$FW 
that shareholders should be able to override the articles and remove any director by simple 
majority. When combined with the emergence of institutional investors, this led in short order to 
the emergence of the hostile takeover and the reorientation of corporate management towards 
an exclusive focus on increasing returns to shareholders. This shift received intellectual 
justification from mainstream economists, who had always insisted that firms should maximise 
profits for an economy to operate efficiently.41 Following the lead of the Gower-led minority on 
                                                          
36 >dĂůďŽƚ ? ‘tŚǇƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚǀŽƚĞ PDĂƌǆŝƐƚ-progressive critique of shareholder 
ĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D>Z ? ? ? 
37 Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Chaired by Jacques de Larosière, 
25 February 2009, Brussels, para 24; The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision 
Making: Final Report (London 2012),  ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ‘'ƌĞĞŶWĂƉĞƌ PŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ
governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies (Brussels, 2.6.2010, COM(2010) 284 
final), 8; and Talbot (2013) (n36) 
38 Board of Trade, Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmd 6659 1943), 9 and 
Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Company Law Amendment Committee (HMSO 1943-1944), 
para 7071 
39 J &ŽƌĞŵĂŶ ?WĞĐŬĂŶĚ>,ĂŶŶĂŚ ? ‘ǆƚƌĞŵĞŝǀŽƌĐĞ PdŚĞDĂŶĂŐĞƌŝůZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝŶh<ŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ
ďĞĨŽƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Economic History Review 1217; TW Guinnane, R Harris, NR Lamoreaux, 
 ‘ŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂů&ƌĞĞĚŽŵĂŶĚƚŚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŽŶƚƌŽůŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?NBER 
Working Paper No 20481 
40 Keynes (n7) 
41 For an overview of these developments, see Johnston (n5) 1013-16 
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the 1962 Jenkins Committee,42 economists argued that hostile takeovers were desirable because 
they moved resources into the hands of more efficient controllers and forced incumbent 
directors to increase share prices if they wanted to head off hostile takeovers; a market for 
corporate control.43 The introduction of the City Code in 1968, preventing directors from taking 
action to defend against unwelcome bids, converted the hostile takeover from an apparently 
unintended consequence of law reform into a policy choice. Under constant threat of takeover, 
directors of listed companies began to adopt many of the practices of takeover bidders, such as 
selling off assets to distribute the proceeds to shareholders and increasing the dividend. 44 
Distributions to shareholders steadily increased from at least the 1970s. 45  This in turn 
XQGHUPLQHGWKHSUDFWLFHRI¶UHWDLQDQGUHLQYHVW·WKURXJKZKLFKFRPSDQLHVKDGILQDQFed most of 
their growth in the first half of the twentieth century.46  
The negative impact of takeovers on development and productivity was episodic because the 
takeover market is cyclical. There were periods, during the 1970s for example, when the threat of 
hostile takeover abated, reducing the pressure on executives to prioritise the shareholder interest. 
However, the election in 1979 of 0DUJDUHW7KDWFKHU·Vneoliberal government brought with it a 
new raft of policy measures that increased the prioritisation of shareholder interests. Encouraged 
by favourable tax provisions, companies began to pay their executives in ways which incentivised 
WKHIXUWKHUGLVWULEXWLRQRIZHDOWKWRVKDUHKROGHUVUDWKHUWKDQLWVUHLQYHVWPHQWLQWKHFRPSDQ\·V
                                                          
42 Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749, 1962), 209 
43 ^ĞĞZDĂƌƌŝƐ ? ‘DŽĚĞůŽĨƚŚĞ “DĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂů ?ŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?YƵĂƌƚĞƌůǇ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ? ? ? ?,'DĂŶŶĞ ? ‘DĞƌŐĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞDĂƌŬĞƚĨŽƌŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŽŶƚƌŽů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ
Political Economy 110 
44 For examples, see G Bull & A Vice, Bid for Power (3rd ed, Elek, 1961); JB Tabb, Accountancy 
Aspects of the Takeover Bids in Britain 1945-1965 (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Sheffield, 
1968) 
45 &ŽƌĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚƐĂŶĚďƵǇďĂĐŬƐŝŶƚŚĞh^ ?ƐĞĞŚĂƌƚ ?ŝŶ,ĂůĚĂŶĞ ? ‘tŚŽŽǁŶƐĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ? ?ƐƉĞĞĐŚ
given at the University of Edinburgh Corporate Finance Conference on Friday 22 May 2015, 
<https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2015/who-owns-a-company> checked 8 May 2018. 
ǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞh<ŝƐŚĂƌĚĞƌƚŽĨŝŶĚ ?ďƵƚ,ĂůĚĂŶĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚ ?ĂĨƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ‘ĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚ
payout ratioƐĂůŵŽƐƚŶĞǀĞƌĨĂůů ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚďƵǇďĂĐŬƐŚĂǀĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇĞǆĐĞĞĚĞƋƵŝƚǇŝƐƐƵĂŶĐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ
past decade. Looking further back, Bull and Vice show that the emergence of the takeover was 
ĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞĚďǇĂ ‘ƐůŝŐŚƚďƵƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞŽĨƉayments of profits to 
shareholders between 1953 and 1956: see Bull and Vice (n44) at 21 
46 For the US practice from 1919 to 1947, see A Berle, Power without Property (Sidgwick & Jackson 
1960), 30-44 
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business. Whilst fixed executive pay could always be deducted from profits, the Finance Act of 
1984 FUHDWHGWKHFRQFHSWRI ¶DSSURYHG·VKDUHVFKHPHV·, which were limited to four times fixed 
pay47 and required a vesting period of between three and ten years. These approved schemes 
allowed listed companies to set the cost of the shares against corporation tax if the option related 
to already existing shares, and so shareholders were protected against dilution. Yet most of the 
schemes submitted to the Inland Revenue for approval involved the issue of new shares, which 
did not have to be recorded as an expense, and therefore protected corporate earnings.48 A 
further advantage was that executive gains on exercise of the options were subject to capital 
gains tax,49 which was lower than income tax,50 and any tax liability only arose when the shares 
were sold, not at the time the option was exercised.51 These tax changes resulted in a dramatic 
uptake of share option schemes among listed companies, so that by 1985, almost every company 
had one.52  
Tax changes were not the only driver of WKHJURZWKRIVKDUHRSWLRQVDQGRWKHU ¶KLJK-powered 
LQFHQWLYHV·VXFKDVVR-FDOOHG¶ORQJ-WHUPLQFHQWLYHSODQV·Guidelines issued by the Association of 
British Insurers between 1984 and 1999 were very influential. Whilst they limited options to four 
time emoluments, they came to be interpreted as an entitlement rather than a ceiling, and led to 
the institutionalisation of share options, even as the tax advantages for individual executives were 
gradually reduced by 1995.53 In 1995, these corporate practices were endorsed by the Greenbury 
Committee, which recommended that remuneration should ¶DOLJQWKH LQWHUHVWVRIdirectors and 
                                                          
47 Finance Act 1984, Schedule 10, paragraph 5(2) 
48 BGM Main ? ‘dŚĞƌŝƐĞĂŶĚĨĂůůŽĨĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐŚĂƌĞŽƉƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ŝŶ:ĂƌƉĞŶƚĞƌĂŶĚzĞƌŵĂĐŬ
(eds), Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value (Springer 1999), 84 
49 Finance Act 1984, s38 
50 At the time capital gains tax was 30% as opposed to income tax at 60%, although the rates were 
harmonised in 1988. See D ŐŐŝŶƚŽŶ ?:&ŽƌŬĞƌĂŶĚ:'ƌŽƵƚ ? ‘ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞĂŶĚŵƉůŽǇĞĞ^ŚĂƌĞKƉƚŝŽŶƐ P
dĂǆĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝůƵƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Accounting & Business Research  ? ? ? ?'DDĂŝŶ ? ‘
Review of Some Questions on Executive PĂǇ ? ?WĂƉĞƌƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƚEzh ?>^ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ
Conference, November 2004 
51 Main (1999) (n48), 84. 
52 Main, ibid, 85, figure 1 
53 DĂŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ŷ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?'DDĂŝŶ ? ‘dŚĞ/ŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐĨŽƌƐŚĂƌĞ-based inventive schemes: setting 
ƚŚĞŚƵƌĚůĞƚŽŽŚŝŐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?) 36 Accounting and Business Research 191 
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VKDUHKROGHUV LQSURPRWLQJ WKHFRPSDQ\·VSURJUHVV·,54 and encouraging the use of performance 
share plans, with shares awarded based on total shareholder return relative to comparator 
institutions.55 Following this, there was a move away from share options to performance share 
plans, but the principle that executive pay should be linked to shareholder value, however 
measured, was well established, and widely accepted by both executives and institutional 
shareholders.  
The growth of incentive pay has contributed to the emergence of enormous income inequalities 
across society. It has incentivised executives to engage in various forms of financial engineering 
in order to enhance the metrics on which their remuneration is based. For example, earnings are 
smoothed to ensure that profits beat the consensus of analysts,56 and distributions only increase 
to keep share prices on an upwards trajectory and ensure that executives receive expected 
compensation OHDGLQJWR+DOGDQH·VREVHUYDWLRQWKDWSD\RXWVWRVKDUHKROGHUVKDYHEHHQD ¶RQH
ZD\ VWUHHW· VLQFH .57 Efforts to tweak the remuneration regime in various iterations of the 
8.·V &RUSRUDWH *RYHUQDQFH FRGH VXFK DV UHTXLULQJ D UHPXQHUDWLRQ FRPPLWWHH FRQVLVWLQJ RI
non-executive directors to set pay,58 DQG HYHQ JLYLQJ VKDUHKROGHUV D ELQGLQJ ¶VD\ RQ SD\· LQ
2013,59 has done nothing to halt the dynamic of rising pay and short-term incentives. The latest 
proposal to UHTXLUHOLVWHGFRPSDQLHVWRSXEOLVKWKHUDWLRRI&(2SD\WR¶WKHDYHUDJHSD\RIWKHLU
8. ZRUNIRUFH· DORQJ ZLWK Dn explanatory narrative, as well as the creation of a new public 
                                                          
54 ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?ZĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ZĞƉŽƌƚŽĨĂ^ƚƵĚǇ'ƌŽƵƉĐŚĂŝƌĞĚďǇ^ŝƌZŝĐŚĂƌĚ'ƌĞĞŶďƵƌǇ (Gee, 1995), 
paras 1.10 and 1.15 
55 ibid, paras 6.31 and 6.39.  
56 ^:dĞƌƌǇ ? ‘dŚĞDĂĐƌŽ/ŵƉĂĐƚŽĨ^ŚŽƌƚ-dĞƌŵŝƐŵ ? ?ŽƐƚŽŶhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇWorking Paper, June 2017, 2-4. 
57 ,ĂůĚĂŶĞ ?Ŷ ? ? ?ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?ĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĂ ‘ŽŶĞǁĂǇƐƚƌĞĞƚ ? 
58 See Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee 1992), para 
4.42. Among the many reasons for the failure of remuneration committees to solve the problem, we 
can note the ratcheting effect of disclosure of pay following Greenbury, as well as the fact that in 
2014, 64 per cent of FTSE 100 remuneration committee members held a position on another 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐďŽĂƌĚ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚ ‘ŶĞĂƌůǇƚǁŽƚŚŝƌĚƐŽĨƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƌĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ
ŝƐĚƌĂǁŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞǁŽƌůĚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚŝŐŚĂŶĚĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞƉĂǇĂƌĞƚĂŬĞŶĨŽƌŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚǁŚŽƐĞ
ŽǁŶůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƉĂǇĂƌĞ ‘ĨĂƌŝŶĞǆĐĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞƉĂǇŽĨŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇǁŽƌŬĞƌƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐĂme companies or 
ĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ? PƐĞĞdh ? ‘ƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨǆĐĞƐƐ PdŚĞƉĂǇŽĨ&d^ ? ? ?ƌĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? 
59 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, s79(4) inserting s439A into Companies Act 2006, 
giving shareholdeƌƐĂďŝŶĚŝŶŐǀŽƚĞŽŶƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?ZĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶWŽůŝĐǇĞǀĞƌǇƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐ 
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register of companies where 20% or more of the shareholders have opposed executive pay 
resolutions seems unlikely to bring about significant change. 60  The reason for this is that, 
however empowered they are, shareholders are unlikely to put up significant resistance to pay 
arrangements that incentivise executives to maximise short-term shareholder returns.61 Whilst 
there is no evidence of shareholders driving changes to pay practices or even mounting 
meaningful opposition to existing pay practices,62 the belief persists that corporate governance 
can be reoriented towards more long-termism and greater sustainability by increasing 
shareholder empowerment.63 
These changes in the incentives of company directors interacted with an important change to 
company law allowing companies to repurchase their shares, so that companies began to buy 
back large quantities of their shares as an alternative to dividends.  
Before 1981, share repurchases were illegal on the basis that they offended against the legal 
prohibition on the company acquiring its own shares.64 Buybacks of shares out of distributable 
profits were first permitted by the Companies Act 1981,65 but dividends continued to form a 
much larger part of distributions to shareholders in UK listed companies, and buybacks were far 
                                                          
60 BEIS, Corporate Governance Reform: The Government response to the green paper consultation, 
(2017), 18-19 
61 Talbot 2013 (n36) 
62 :ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶĂŶĚWDŽƌƌŽǁ ? ‘dŽǁĂƌĚƐ>ŽŶŐ-termism in Corporate Governance: The Shareholder 
ZŝŐŚƚƐŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĚĞǇŽŶĚ ?ŝŶ^sŝƚŽůƐ ?ĞĚ ? ?Long-term Investment and the Sustainable Company: a 
Stakeholder Perspective (ETUI 2015) 
63 ^ĞĞĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƚŽƌĞǀŝƐĞƚŚĞ^ŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌZŝŐŚƚƐŝƌĞĐƚŝǀe to 
 ‘ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽƚŚĞůŽŶŐ-ƚĞƌŵƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨhĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ďǇŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚůĞǀĞůŽĨ
ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ ‘ĂďĞƚƚĞƌůŝŶŬďĞƚǁĞŶƉĂǇĂŶĚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ? PǆƉůĂŶĂƚŽƌǇ
Memorandum accompanying European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of 
long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the 
corporate governance statement (COM/2014/0213 final). The enacted directive is Directive (EU) 
2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 
2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement (OJ L 132/1, 
20.5.2017) 
64 Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409 
65 The reforms were presented to Parliament on the basis that they would be of value primarily to 
small companies, allowing them to raise outside capital without losing control of the family business: 
HC Deb 1 June 1981, vol 5 cols 646-730 
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less common than in the US, where the SEC made buybacks easier around the same time.66 
However, buybacks began to increase in the UK from 1987, 67 mostly concentrated in larger 
listed companies, at a time at which executive pay was increasingly very rapidly (presumably as 
executives exercised their options).68 Between 1997 and 2007, buybacks accounted for almost 
one third of distributions to shareholders, 69 reaching a peak in 2006 and 2007, when UK listed 
companies repurchased £32.5bn and £29.4bn of shares, but declining considerably since the 
financial crisis of 2008.70 Indeed, repurchases have occurred at such a scale that, apart from the 
three year period following the financial crisis, when companies needed to raise equity in order to 
pay down bank debt, net equity issuance by non-financial companies was generally negative 
between 2004 and 2014. 71  Short-term shareholders and executives have a shared love of 
buybacks. For short-term shareholders it offers tax advantages, whilst executives like them 
because, under current remuneration practices, they provide an immediate boost to the share 
price, allowing them to exercise options at favourable prices, and increase earnings per share, 
allowing them to meet performance criteria in LTIPs. In contrast, other uses of corporate 
earnings such as investments in innovation or productive capacity may only produce returns 
after the executive has moved on. 72  For short-term shareholders waiting for a buyback 
announcement or a takeover bid, long-term investments have even less attraction.   
 
                                                          
66 t>ĂǌŽŶŝĐŬĂŶĚDDĂǌǌƵĐĂƚŽ ? ‘dŚĞƌŝƐŬ-reward nexus in the innovation-inequality relationship: 
who taŬĞƐƚŚĞƌŝƐŬƐ ?tŚŽŐĞƚƐƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƌĚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Industrial and Corporate Change 1093, 1115-
6 
67 tZĞĞƐ ? ‘dŚĞ/ŵƉĂĐƚŽĨKƉĞŶDĂƌŬĞƚƋƵŝƚǇZĞƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƐŽŶh<ƋƵŝƚǇWƌŝĐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?European 
Journal of Finance  ? ? ? ?dŽŵƐĂŶĚtƌŝŐŚƚŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘'ǁĂƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ company to utilise the share 
buy-back provisions of the 1981 Companies Act, in order to start reducing its mountain of surplus 
ĐĂƐŚ ? PƐĞĞ^dŽŵƐĂŶĚDtƌŝŐŚƚ ? ‘ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĂŶĚ^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŝŶƌŝƚŝƐŚƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ
History, 1950- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Business History 91, 108. 
68 See Main (1999) (n48), 87, figure 2 
69 >ZĞŶŶĞďŽŽŐĂŶĚ'dƌŽũĂŶŽǁƐŬŝ ? ‘WĂƚƚĞƌŶƐŝŶƉĂǇŽƵƚƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƉĂǇŽƵƚĐŚĂŶŶĞůĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Journal of Banking and Finance 1477 
70 ĂŶŬŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ ? ‘YƵĂƌƚĞƌůǇƌĞƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐŽĨĂůůĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇƐŚares by UK issuers total in sterling not 
ƐĞĂƐŽŶĂůůǇĂĚũƵƐƚĞĚ ? ?WY ? ?< W Quarterly) 
71 Haldane (n45), Chart 3 
72 J Plender, Capitalism (Biteback Publishing 2015), 509 
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iii. Some Outcomes of the Empowerment of Irresponsible Ownership:  Barriers to Development and 
Innovation  
Shareholder value driven corporate activity has a negative impact on research, innovation and 
productivity. This is a clear indicator of economic and social irresponsibility and a failure of 
capitalist fundamentals. Profit seeking was justified in Schumpeterian analysis as driving 
innovation and forcing out old technologies through ¶FUHDWLYH GHVWUXFWLRQ· 73  leading to 
prescriptions for an unregulated economy in which those dynamics could freely play out. 
However, today, profit seeking is more likely to be pursued by avoiding innovation and capital 
investment and by maintaining old technologies because low labour productivity can be offset by 
low domestic wages and super-exploited labour in global value chains.  
Directors are cautious about undertaking long term investment because shareholders avoid 
companies with long term investment plans. Committed investment in R&D is considered too 
risky.74 Shareholders make short-term commitments and want short-term rewards to match.75 As 
institutional investors of various stripes have become more activist, executives have responded 
to shareholder preferences, with adverse consequences for wider society in the form of reduced 
R&D spending. The Financial Times reports that UK expenditure on R&D was 1.7% of GDP in 
2015, with businesses spending around two thirds of the total. Investment in R&D has been 
stagnant for 15 years and far below levels in competitor European and Asian economies with 
Germany at 2.7%, China at 3.1% and  South Korea at 4.3%.76 The Deputy Governor of the 
Bank of England, Sir Jon Cunliffe noted that one reason for weak investment by UK companies 
since the financial crisis is weak demand; another reason is the lack of finance for productive 
investment, with banks primarily lending for mortgage financing, and one in five firms facing 
external financing constraints. However, nearly 70% of firms that reported underinvestment 
cited a lack of internal funds as an obstacle, with internally generated funds used to make 
                                                          
73 J Schumpeter, Can Capitalism Survive? (originally published 1947, Martino Publishing 2011), 23 
74 Talbot (2016) (n9), 520 
75 Average shareholding periods have fallen in the UK from around 6 years in 1950 to less than 6 
months today: Haldane (n45), 11-12 and Chart 1.  
76 ':ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ? ‘WƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶh<ƐƉĞŶĚƐŽŶZ ?ƐƚĂŐŶĂŶƚĨŽƌ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐ ?ƐĂǇƐ/ ? ?Financial Times, 
(London, 22 March 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/72ad9708-0d95-11e7-a88c-
50ba212dce4d?mhq5j=e2> checked 8 May 2018. See also the Kay Review (n37), 16, fig 2, showing 
the UK lagging behind the US, France and Germany from 1992 to 2010, despite the fact that quoted 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐĂƌĞ ‘ĂǁĂƐŚ ?ǁŝƚŚĐĂƐŚ 
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distributions to shareholders and purchase financial assets, whilst RI¶SXEOLFO\RZQHG·ILUPV
¶DJUHHG WKDW ILQDQFLDO PDUNHW SUHVVXUH IRU VKRUW-term returns to shareholders had been an 
REVWDFOH WR LQYHVWPHQW·. 77  This is important as R&D expenditures are overwhelmingly 
concentrated in a limited number of companies. 78  While non-financial pressures, including 
¶JUHDWHU ULVN DYHUVLRQDQGJUHDWHUXQFHUWDLQW\ DERXW WKHHFRQRPLFHQYLURQPHQW·79 clearly play a 
role in reducing levels of R&D, risk aversion can, at least in part, be attributed to patterns of 
executive remuneration which deter investments in long-term projects whose payoff is uncertain 
(and likely to occur after the executives ² and the current shareholders ² have moved on). The 
%DQN RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6HWWOHPHQWV DWWULEXWHV ORZ 5	' LQYHVWPHQW WR WKH ¶ULVN\ WULQLW\· of 
¶unusually low productivity growth, unusually high debt levels, and unusually limited room for 
SROLF\ PDQHXYHU·.80 ,W KLJKOLJKWV WKH JURZWK RI ¶]RPELH FRPSDQLHV·, those just about able to 
service their debts but with no ability to invest and progress.  
Companies have increasingly used low interest debt to finance their balance sheets, to fund 
incentive pay and feed the takeover driven imperative to produce shareholder value. This has 
further undermined investment in future capabilities. Although debt has long been used for 
corporate financing, 81 companies, under pressure to increase shareholder value, now pay out 
                                                          
77 :ƵŶůŝĨĨĞ ? ‘ƌĞĨŝƌŵƐƵŶĚĞƌŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŶŐ W ĂŶĚŝĨƐŽǁŚǇ ? ? ?ƐƉĞĞĐŚŐŝǀĞŶĂƚ'ƌĞĂƚĞƌŝƌŵŝŶŐŚĂŵ
Chamber of Commerce, 8th February 2017, 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2017/speech957.pdf> 
checked 8 May 2018, 6-9 
78 In 2009, among the 1000 UK companies that invest the most in R&D, the top 50 carried out 60% of 
the investment, and 100 accounted for 80%. R&D expenditures were overwhelmingly concentrated 
in listed and foreign-owned companies. However, the top 1000 companies in the UK had a R&D 
density of 1.7% of sales, compared with global R&D density of the top 1000 companies 
(overwhelmingly concentrated in the US, UK, France, Germany, Switzerland and Japan) of 3.6%. The 
R&D density of listed UK companies (1.4%) in the UK top 1000 was markedly lower than that of 
private companies (2.1%) and foreign-owned companies (2.7%): see BIS, The 2010 R&D Scoreboard, 
URN 10/31A, November 2010 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101208170547/http://www.innovation.gov.uk/rd_sc
oreboard/downloads/2010_RD_Scoreboard_analysis.pdf> checked 8 May 2018 
79 Cunliffe (77), 9 
80 Bank for International Settlements, Towards Resilient Growth, BIS Annual Report, June 2017 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2017e1.htm> checked 8 May 2018, 8  
81 Debentures secured by a floating charge were the preferred way of raising debt capital in the late 
ŶŝŶĞƚĞĞŶƚŚĂŶĚĞĂƌůǇƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌŝĞƐ ?^ĞĞĞ ?Ő ?DĂŶƐŽ  ? ‘dŚĞ'ƌŽǁƚŚŽĨƚŚĞĞďĞŶƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 ? ?>YZ ? ? ? ?'DĂĐŽŶĂůĚ ? ‘dŚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞďĞŶƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>YZ ? ? ? 
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accumulated reserves, whether held onshore or offshore to shareholders in the form of 
dividends and share buybacks, using bond issuance to replace those funds with debt on the 
balance sheet.82 In the US, corporate debt levels are 30% higher than before the crisis and the 
$8.6 trillion of corporate debt constitutes 45.3% of GDP.83 
Increasing leverage makes companies riskier, renders employment more perilous, and by 
eliminating free cash flow, starves companies of internally generated funds which they can invest 
in the business. Instead, internally generated funds are distributed to lenders and shareholders 
through loan repayments and share buybacks, and it is up to those investors to decide whether, 
and if so, where, to reinvest that money.  A vicious circle is created by the combination of 
pressure to produce shareholder value, the risk of investment and falling returns on investment. 
Debt is a short-term solution to this, but in the medium to long-term merely renders companies 
unable to invest because they must use the funds they generate to pay debts. Debt servicing and 
more debt becomes the solution for all but the largest companies.  
The lack of investment in innovation and productivity is offset by the use of ¶super exploited· 
global labour. The scale of this practice is hard to estimate, given the difficulty in obtaining data 
about the extent of offshoring by UK companies.84 The UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 imposes a 
¶Transparency in Supply Chains· obligation, requiring, from 2016, UK companies with a global 
turnover of over £36 million to make an annual statement on the due diligence they exercise in 
relation to the use of slave labour in their supply chains. However, this requirement has 
generated little more than general statements on the abhorrence of slavery, while slavery itself 
                                                          
82 ZZŝĞĚĞƌ ? ‘Winners and losers from share buybĂĐŬƐ ? ?Financial Times (London, 15 June 2015) < 
https://www.ft.com/content/61509e02-0cf6-11e5-a83a-00144feabdc0> checked 8 May 2018. The 
leveraged recap approach, where borrowing and distribution to shareholders are announced at the 
ƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞĐĂŶĂůƐŽďĞƵƐĞĚďǇĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŚĂǀĞ ‘ůĂƌŐĞĐĂƐŚďĂůĂŶĐĞƐ “ƚƌĂƉƉĞĚ ?ŽĨĨƐŚŽƌĞ ?
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚĂůůŽǁƐƚŚĞŵƚŽ ‘ƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽƌĞƉĂƚƌŝĂƚĞƚŚĞŽĨĨƐŚŽƌĞĨƵŶĚƐ ? PƐĞĞ:W
MorgĂŶ ? ‘ “>ĞǀĞƌĂŐĞĚƌĞĐĂƉƐ ? PƵŶůŽĐŬŝŶŐŚŝĚĚĞŶďĂůĂŶĐĞƐŚĞĞƚǀĂůƵĞ ? ?ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ
Brief, May 2013, <https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320670225793.pdf> checked 8 May 2018 
83 M RobertƐ ? ‘dŚĞŶĚŽĨY ? ? ? ?st September 2017, 
<https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2017/09/21/the-end-of-qe/> checked 8 May 2018 
84 The OECD published research in 2007 relating to 2005, showing that only 3.4% of job losses in the 
UK (6,764 out of 200,706) were attributable to offshoring: see OECD, Offshoring and employment: 
Trends and impacts  ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐŝƚĞĚŝŶ,'ƂƌŐ ? ‘'ůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĨƐŚŽƌŝŶŐĂŶĚũŽďƐ ?ŝŶDĂĐĐŚĞƚƚĂĂŶĚD
Jansen (eds), Making Globalization Socially Sustainable (WTO/ILO 2011), 30. 
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continues.85  The ILO estimates that $150billion globally is generated from forced labour in value 
chains.86 The amount generated from acute low pay and poor working conditions in global value 
chains is, of course, much greater, with global value chains making up 80% of global trade.87  
As an increasing share of corporate surplus has been distributed by companies to their 
shareholders, wages have stagnated both domestically 88  and internationally. 89  In the UK, 
increasing numbers of employees are employed on zero hours contracts. There has been a fall in 
the number of full time employees as a proportion of total employment since 2008,90 and 2.8% 
of those in employment (905,000 people) are reported to be on a zero hours contract.91 The low 
rates of productivity reported by the Office of Fiscal Studies can be directly attributed to the 
actions of companies in delivering shareholder value throughout periods of falling profitability 
by the methods discussed. This directly impacts on wages and standard of living for most people; 
¶Real wages are due to be flat next year, and even in 2022²23 average earnings are due to be 
                                                          
85 See for example House of Lords and House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
Human Rights and Business 2017: Promoting responsibility and ensuring accountability, Sixth Report 
of Session 2016 W17, HL Paper 153, HC 443, paras 92-105 
86 ILO, Combating forced labour: A handbook for employers and business (revised edition 2015) 
87 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains and Development: Investment and 
Trade for Development, 135 
88 sZŽŵĞŝ ? ‘,ŽǁǁĂŐĞƐĨĞůůŝŶƚŚĞh<ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇŐƌĞǁ ? ?Financial Times (London, 2 March 
2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/83e7e87e-fe64-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30> checked 8 May 
2018 
89 >ůůŝŽƚƚ ? ‘hƉƚŽ ? ?A?ŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ “ŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŶŝŶĐŽŵĞƐƐƚĂŐŶĂƚĞ ? ? ?The 
Guardian (London, 14 July 2016),  <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/14/up-to-70-
per-cent-people-developed-countries-seen-income-stagnate> checked 8 May 2018  
90 BEIS, Good Work: The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices, July 2017, 23. The Taylor review 
ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚ ‘ďĞůŝĞǀĞƐĨŝƌŵůǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚŽŶĞĨŽƌĨĂŝƌ
and decent work is set at the top of an organisation, reflecting the demands of shareholders and 
consumers and extending out into the workforce and thĞǁŝĚĞƌƐƵƉƉůǇĐŚĂŝŶ ?ĂŶĚĐĂůůƐĨŽƌŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ
transparency about structure of workforces so that shareholders and workers can take informed 
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ŝďŝĚ ? ? ? ?dŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? ‘ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŽǁŶĞƌƐ ? ?ǁŝůůĚĞŵĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ
employees receive better treĂƚŵĞŶƚĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ǁŝĚĞƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽ
ǁŽƌŬĨŽƌƚŚĞŵ ?ŝƐĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? 
91 ŝďŝĚ ? ? ?ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?ĐŽƵůĚďĞ ‘Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚŝŶƉĂƌƚ ?ĚƵĞƚŽ an improved 
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐƚǇƉĞŽĨĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ? 
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below where they were in 2007²08. That implies a lost decade and a half of wage growth, an 
XQSUHFHGHQWHGSHULRGRIVWDJQDQWHDUQLQJVLQWKH8.·92 
 
IV. How to Make Capitalism More Responsible: Reforming the company or using an 
existing alternative corporate form?  
a. Making Capitalism More Responsible by Reforming the Company  
According to the analysis and evidence presented thus far, the development of the modern 
company underpinned by separate legal personality and limited liability constituted shareholders 
as owners of a fungible property form which they buy, hold or sell to enhance their financial 
returns. Other tweaks to the legal and soft law regimes have further strengthened the position of 
shareholders. The ascendance of the shareholder as rentier is part of the historical development 
of capitalism. The doctrine of separate corporate personality evidences shareholders· severance 
from the company·V assets, and their role as rentiers in the purest sense. However, the logic of 
separate corporate personality has not been fully implemented in the law, as shareholders retain 
important control rights which go beyond their interests as rentiers. These control rights may be 
appropriate for partners or entrepreneurs who are equipped to exercise control and to discharge 
the social responsibilities this entails. In contrast, giving control rights to rentiers substantially 
increases short-term, high risk corporate-decision making because rentiers have few incentives to 
use their control rights to promote the long-term development of the company and many 
incentives to use them to extract value in the short-term. Written across the board, rentier-driven 
short-termism undermines the innovative capacity and productivity of capitalism as well as giving 
rise to huge and varied social costs.  
In order to achieve greater responsibility, control rights should be removed from shareholders, 
or least spread more widely around those who are affected E\ WKH FRPSDQ\·V DFWLYLWLHV We 
accept that the law should protect VKDUHKROGHUV·rights to dividends, their right to dispose of their 
property and their right to information which impacts on the value of their property.  Similarly, 
their protection from the liabilities of the company should be retained, even in cases of personal 
                                                          
92 dWŽƉĞ ‘/ƚŵĂǇũƵƐƚƐŽƵŶĚůŝŬĞĂƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐ ?ďƵƚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŐƌŽǁƚŚŵĂƚƚĞƌƐĨŽƌĂůůŽĨƵƐ ? ?,ƵĨĨŝŶŐƚŽŶ
Post (24 November 2017) <https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/10191> checked 8 May 2018 
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injury.93 Indeed, this is logical, given their position as rentiers who are not (and should not) be 
engaged in management decision-making and therefore are no more responsible for the fortunes 
of the company than its creditors.  
As such, we propose that the rights of rentiers should be limited to those concerning their own 
property rights in four key areas: to information relating to the value of their shares; to free 
transferability; to declared dividends; and to limited liability.94 This limitation would exclude 
shareholder control rights over the company as a whole, such as their right to remove the 
directors by simple majority under section 168 CA 2006, which is the ultimate source of their 
influence and control over directors and their decision-making.  Along these lines, the 
International Panel for Social Progress, in its report on corporations and finance,95  recently 
proposed that existing shareholder control rights over the company could be devolved to 
company stakeholders within a new stakeholder board. They recognise that shareholders require 
some forum in which to make their views known, but argue that shareholder views need to be 
balanced against those of other stakeholders to ensure articulation of the wider range of interests 
required for sound and balanced governance.  They identify employees as being particularly 
important in ensuring that the company meets social goals and maintains a credible long-term 
investment strategy. Employees, they argue, have an intrinsic interest in the long-term 
development of the business because this affects the long-term stability of their employment. 
7KH3DQHO·VSURSRVDOshares our identification of shareholder power with poor governance.  
We also argue for a radical reduction of shareholder decision-making in relation to takeovers. 
This may seem contradictory given our argument that shareholder rights should be maintained in 
relation to transferability of shares. This makes it arguable that the powers given to shareholders 
in takeover regulation are defensible because they simply relate to the ability of shareholders to 
decide on the sale and transfer of their shares. However, VKDUHKROGHUV·SRZHUV under takeover 
regulation in fact go much further than free transferability. Article 21 of the Takeover Code 
allows shareholders to decide whether the directors may take defensive measures against a 
                                                          
93 ŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚĂŬĞŶŝŶ,,ĂŶƐŵĂŶŶĂŶĚZ<ƌĂĂŬŵĂŶŶ ? ‘dŽǁĂƌĚhŶůŝŵŝƚĞĚ^ŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ
>ŝĂďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞdŽƌƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?zĂůĞ>Ăǁ:ŽƵƌŶĂů ? ? ? ? 
94 As proposed by AA Berle in The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (Harcourt, Brace and Company 
1954), 24 and PF Drucker in The New Society The Anatomy of the Industrial Order (Windmill Press 
1951), 320 
95 /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWĂŶĞůĨŽƌ^ŽĐŝĂůWƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ? ‘DĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞĂŶĚĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ PĚŽĞƐĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵŚĂǀĞĂ
future? ?ŝŶSocial Progress for the 21st Century (CUP, forthcoming 2018) 
25 
 
takeover, a decision they will take according to how it affects the value of their shares. This right, 
which we argue should be removed, goes beyond transfer rights which exist purely to protect the 
rentier arrangement by allowing trade in titles to revenue. It enables shareholders to interfere 
with the workings of the productive entity, from which they are fundamentally distinct, whilst 
management and employees, who are an integral part of the enterprise, have no such rights.  
Their purely rentier interests coupled with the absence of any fiduciary duty to the company 
means that their exercise of these powers is likely to be self-serving and destructive of the 
enterprise.  
An end to Article 21 of the Takeover Code would give companies more, but not sufficient, 
scope to defend against takeovers, at least where detriment to the business or other stakeholders 
is likely. This would help resist irresponsible takeovers that are driven by short-term financial 
considerations. The UK is permitted to take such an approach under the EU Takeover Directive, 
and a number of EU Member States give companies some scope to defend unwelcome takeover. 
Indeed, discussion about changes to takeover regulation are currently under way in the 
Netherlands, much to the consternation of large shareholders.96  
Yet, abolishing Article 21 would simply return the UK to the proper purposes rule, which is still 
fairly shareholder-centric.97 Takeover regulation therefore requires a significant rebalancing of 
powers within the company, as well as the abolition of Article 21, in order to encourage socially 
responsible takeover activity. A representative stakeholder board, with powers over the takeover 
process and with duties to promote the success of the enterprise, could articulate the interests of 
those most affected by a proposed takeover, and would be more likely to ensure a responsible 
outcome to any negotiations.  
More generally, a stakeholder board would provide a countervailing force to shareholder value 
imperatives, potentially influencing managerial discretion in the interests of wider society. 
Employees are a particularly important voice, having a far greater concern with the long-term 
                                                          
96 DDĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ? ‘&ƌĞƐŚŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌŽƵƚĐƌǇŽǀĞƌƵƚĐŚƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌĐƵƌďƉůĂŶƐ ? ?Financial Times (London 15 
July 2017), <https://www.ft.com/content/53759dea-688a-11e7-9a66-93fb352ba1fe> checked 8 May 
2018, noting proposals to allow the management and supervisory boards time to consider the 
implications of a proposed takeover for all stakeholders, extend the current soft law 180 day 
 ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŽŐŝǀĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐŵŽƌĞƚŝŵĞƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌďŽƚŚƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌƐĂŶĚĚĞŵĂŶĚƐĨƌŽŵĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚ
shareholders, as well as other measures to allow friendly takeovers. 
97 For analysis, see A Johnston,  ‘dĂŬĞŽǀĞƌZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ P,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂŶĚdŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůWerspectives on the 
ŝƚǇŽĚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>: ? ? ?
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survival and development of the business than diversified shareholders with liquid portfolios. As 
0F*DXJKH\SXWVLW¶7KHXOWLPDWHLQYHVWRUVVKRXOGKDYHDYRLFH%XW´LQYHVWPHQWRIODERXUµLQ
enterprise always jXVWLILHV WKH YRWH·98 (PSOR\HH LQWHUHVWV DUH ERXQG WR WKH FRQVWDQW ¶FUHDWLYH
GHVWUXFWLRQ· ZKLFK LV LQWULQVLF WR FDSLWDOLVP. Innovation in various forms has the potential to 
benefit society in a way that enhancing shareholder value through financial restructuring does 
not. It also exposes to employees to significant risk where they specialise in response to 
innovation, or otherwise make investments in firm-specific human capital. In contrast to 
employees, shareholders are intrinsically transitory and concerned with immediate returns. 
Employee representation on boards ² whether on the suggested stakeholder board or through 
other forms of representation ² would help shape a more responsible capitalism, provided they 
had sufficient, independent voice. It is regrettable that, no sooner had she made it, Theresa May 
backtracked on her promise to put employee representatives on boards.99 
Finding mechanisms to reduce the control powers shareholders currently possess would be an 
important step towards making capitalism more responsible. First, it would reduce the direct 
exercise of those powers by shareholders in their own inherently short-term interests, and 
second it would relieve some of the pressure on directors to make decisions that prioritise 
shareholder interests.  However, as noted above, much of the impetus behind director decision-
making in the interests of shareholders is the integration of shareholder value into the various 
legal and governance mechanisms which operate to align companies· executive remuneration 
strategies with the short-term interests of shareholders. Accordingly, policies designed to 
enhance responsibility will need to forensically identify and remove this alignment. Prior to the 
introduction of these remuneration strategies, the separation of ownership (of shares) from 
control (exercised by directors and managers) was viewed as essential to the capacity of directors 
                                                          
98 DĐ'ĂƵŐŚĞǇ ? ‘dǁĞůǀĞWŽŝŶƚWůĂŶĨŽƌ>ĂďŽƵƌĂŶĚDĂŶŝĨĞƐƚŽĨŽƌ>ĂďŽƵƌ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?/>: ? ? ? ?
177 
99 Theresa May ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝĨ/ ?ŵWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ QǁĞ ?ƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽŚĂǀĞŶŽƚũƵƐƚĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ
represented on coŵƉĂŶǇďŽĂƌĚƐ ?ďƵƚĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐĂƐǁĞůů ? ? ‘We can make Britain a country that works 
ĨŽƌĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ? ?ƐƉĞĞĐŚŐŝǀĞŶŝŶŝƌŵŝŶŐŚĂŵ ? ?th July 2016 
<http://press.conservatives.com/post/147947450370/we-can-make-britain-a-country-that-works-
for> checked 8 May 2018); Theresa May, Keynote Speech at Conservative Party Conference (5 
October 2016) claiming that plans to put both consumer and worker representatives on boards 
would be published before the end of the year; Theresa May, Keynote Speech to Confederation of 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘tŚŝůĞŝƚŝƐ ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǀŽŝĐĞƐŽĨǁŽƌŬĞƌƐĂŶĚ
consumers should be represented, I can categorically tell you that this is not about mandating works 
ĐŽƵŶĐŝůƐ ?ŽƌƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚŽĨǁŽƌŬĞƌƐŽƌƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐŽŶďŽĂƌĚƐ Q ?
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to exercise stewardship. The separation enabled them to exercise discretion in a fair, disinterested 
way in the interests of the company as a separate entity. 100 Realigning their interests with those of 
shareholders undermines their ability to serve the interests of the company and to act as 
company stewards. Director stewardship of the enterprise requires independence and directors 
should not be incentivised to advance the interests of any one particular company constituent.101  
Regulation might prohibit incentives linked to the current share price, or cap pay by reference to 
fixed pay, as is now done in banks,102 or to the average employee in the company or even the 
national average wage. A minimal and interim requirement could be to link executive pay to ESG 
factors. There are signs that this approach is becoming more widely accepted: the BEIS report 
UHFRPPHQGHG WKDW ¶FRPSDQLHV PDNH LW their policy to align bonuses with broader corporate 
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV DQG FRPSDQ\ REMHFWLYHV· VXFK DV ¶FXVWRPHU VHUYLFH VDIHW\ HPSOR\PHQW RU
HQYLURQPHQWDO LVVXHV·103 However, there is no sign of shareholders pressing for these types of 
changes to remuneration policies, and remuneration committees retain considerable discretion to 
design strategies under the baleful influence of remuneration consultants.   
Hence, it may be necessary to go further and prohibit bonuses altogether, replacing them with a 
rate RI IL[HG SD\ DSSURSULDWH WR WKH MRE $V WKH .D\ 5HYLHZ QRWHG ¶ZH PLJKW DVN ZK\ LW LV
necessary or appropriate to pay bonuses to the directors of large companies at all. Many people 
doing responsible and demanding jobs ² cabinet ministers, judges, surgeons, research scientists ² 
do not receive bonuses, and would be insulted by the suggestion that the prospect of bonuses 
ZRXOG HQFRXUDJH WKHP WR SHUIRUP WKHLU GXWLHV PRUH FRQVFLHQWLRXVO\· 104  However, executive 
bonuses are not intended to incentivise conscientiousness; they are, as we saw above, intended to 
encourage them to exercise their very broad legal discretion for the benefit of shareholders, 
                                                          
100 >dĂůďŽƚ ? ‘WŽůĂŶǇŝ ?ƐŵďĞĚĚĞĚŶĞƐƐĂŶĚ^ŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ^ƚĞǁĂƌĚƐŚŝƉ PĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƵĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ
Anglo-American perƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽŶŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
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101 B Segrestin and A Hatchuel, ZĞĨŽŶĚĞƌů ?ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌŝƐĞ (Editions du Seuil et La République des Idées 
2012) 
102 A Johnston,  ‘WƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞEĞǆƚ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƌŝƐŝƐ ?ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŶŐĂŶŬĞƌƐ ?WĂǇŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Journal of Law and Society 6 
103 House of Commons, Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, Corporate Governance, 
Third Report of Session 2016-17, 30th March 2017, Recommendation 19 and para 86. 
104 Kay Review (n37) 77 
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rather than pursuing other social goals, as they are legally entitled to do. Thus, bonuses 
undermine conscientiousness, distort the exercise of discretion, and focus executives on the 
short-term financial interests of shareholders at the expense of the long-term interests of the 
company and its various stakeholders.  
Reforms to executive pay and takeover regulation would in turn reduce the incentive to engage 
in share buybacks. Yet, it would be more effective still to prohibit share buy backs entirely. The 
prohibition on returning capital to shareholders by repurchasing their shares was, until the 1981 
reforms, in place from late nineteenth century and set out most clearly in the case of Trevor v 
Whitworth, in which the House of Lords ruled that, even if permitted by the articles, buybacks 
would always be void as ultra vires without court sanction because they would be ¶LQFRQVLVWHQW
ZLWKWKHYHU\FRQVWLWXWLRQRIDMRLQWVWRFNFRPSDQ\ZLWKOLPLWHGOLDELOLW\·105  Thus, even before 
the decision in Salomon, shareholder and company (even, as in this case, a family company) were 
distinct and separate. The company was a separate entity which used shareholders· capital to 
engage in productive activity, which also involved engagement with creditors and the public who 
were legally entitled to trust that, whilst capital might be lost in the course of trading, the capital 
stated in the memorandum would be used for trading, or to meet liabilities, and not returned to 
shareholders.  
It was inherent in the very nature of a joint stock limited liability company that shareholders· 
investment could only be recuperated by selling their shares to another person. Shareholders 
could not claim back capital from the company because that undermined the position of 
creditors and the productive activities of the company. The same logic that distinguished 
company capital from shareholder assets also sKLHOGHG VKDUHKROGHUV IURP WKH FRPSDQ\·V
liabilities. The law which protected their rights as rentiers similarly protected the company from 
shareholder claims to capital, enabling the productive entity to thrive and innovate. The 
(apparently unintended, but extensive) use made of the reforms to capital maintenance rules in 
1981 has undermined this separation and inhibited the ability of productive entities to take risks. 
The nineteenth century insistence on this separation established a rule which enabled the 
company form to facilitate huge advances in productivity. It should be re-established.  
The reforms we have discussed in this section are based on a common principle: the company, 
as the institution which most successfully disWLOV FDSLWDOLVP·VSULPDU\GUive to profit maximise, 
should be made more responsible by being given greater autonomy from the demands of 
                                                          
105 Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App. Cas. 409, 416 and 436 
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shareholders and markets for profit maximisation. Essentially, companies should be less 
capitalist and more like productive social institutions that mediate the competing interests that 
are at stake.  
 
b. Making Capitalism Responsible through an Alternative Corporate Form?  
To conclude our proposals to make capitalism more responsible we take a detour into a business 
form that was established in 2004 106  by a Labour government with the aim of fostering 
productive social institutions and a degree of inclusive, responsible capitalism: The Community 
Interest Company (CIC). The CIC modifies the corporate form with the express intention of 
reducing the profit-maximising imperative to which standard limited liability companies are 
subject. We have argued that a reformed legal framework for the limited liability company would 
contribute towards a more responsible capitalism. In what follows, we ask whether the CIC, with 
its modified organisational structure and constitution, represents an already existing but more 
responsible alternative to the limited liability company. Beyond that, we evaluate the extent to 
which it has, in more than ten years of existence, encouraged responsible capitalism. 
Our analysis thus far shows that to discourage irresponsible capitalism the legal form under 
which capitalism operates should have organisational mechanisms which limit the use of 
financialisation to drive profit maximisation. Company law should encourage investment and 
innovation and should internalise employee and stakeholder decision-making processes to 
bolster long term investment and to resist short term shareholder value strategies.  
1. The features of the CIC 
The Community Interest Company already possesses those organisational features. The CIC is a 
company designed to deliver capitalism, to be sure, but stakeholder capitalism which has a 
community purpose and in which most of its profits are reinvested.  The CIC can deliver profits 
to members, but if they do, this is tempered by features such as a dividend cap and an asset lock. 
Stakeholder governance is enabled and encouraged. And because a CIC can be formed as any 
other registered company, public or private, limited by shares, guarantee or by guarantee and 
having share capital, it can apply to all sizes of business and all ownership structures. Any 
existing company may convert into a CIC and thereby adopt the modifications specified in the 
Act to facilitate its social/business hybrid nature. 
                                                          
106 See Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004  
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The CIC is formally committed to a social purpose and to activities which benefit the 
community. Whether its purpose is of sufficient benefit to the community is determined by a 
community interest test which is satisfied where the regulator concludes that a reasonable person 
might consider that its activities are being carried on for the benefit of the community,107 or, 
where the regulations state that specific activities do, or do not, benefit the community.108 This 
test goes some way to ensuring that the social purpose of a CIC cannot be unduly manipulated. 
In this way, it is significantly more effective than the objects clause of a standard company in the 
past, when social purpose clauses were routinely rejected by the courts as ultra vires. 109 
Community purpose is also bolstered by the requirement that all CICs must submit an annual 
CIC report which shows how the community interest test has been met. The regulator has wide 
powers to ensure that CICs adhere to their public benefit commitments. Of the few complaints 
made to the regulator about CIC activity, the most common is failure to operate for a 
community purpose, which could indicate that the regulator is perceived as an effective monitor 
of this CIC attribute.110  
If the CIC is limited by shares, the CIC modifications also impose a dividend cap. The cap 
requires that dLVWULEXWLRQVRIDQ\NLQG WR WKHFRPSDQ\·VPHPEHUVDUH OLPLWHGRUFDSSHG at the 
level set out in the regulations.111 As discussed above, in a registered limited liability company, 
WKH GLUHFWRUV· SULQFLSDO RULHQWDWLRQ LV WKH HQKDQFHPHQW RI VKDUHKROGHU YDOXH ZKLFK KDV PDQ\
negative or socially undesirable outcomes. Thus, by limiting dividends, the CIC regulations 
significantly curtail the incentives to profit maximise, while enhancing the probability of 
reinvestment in the business.  The dividend cap is a potentially transformative feature. 
Another important modification to the company form is the asset lock which directly prohibits 
asset transfers to members. Assets can be transferred to another asset-locked body which is 
specified in the &,&·VDUWLFOHVRIDVVRFLDWLRQRUDQRWKHUERG\with the consent of the Regulator; 
                                                          
107 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise Act 2004, s35(2). The Regulations 
state that it would not be for the benefit of the community if the activities only benefitted the 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ 
108 The Regulations exclude political activities as not being beneficial to the community 
109 Re Lee, Behrens and Co Ltd [1932] 2 Ch 46 
110 Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Annual Report 2016-17 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/630211/cic-17-
2community-interest-companies-annual-report-2016-2017.pdf> checked 8 May 2018, 12 
111 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004, s30  
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or otherwise if this is for the benefit of the community. Assets can be sold provided they are sold 
for full market value and the funds are retained by the company. This package of controls blocks 
PDQ\RIWKHSUREOHPVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHYDOXDWLRQRISULYDWHFRPSDQLHV·DVVHWVDQGWKHYDULRXV
ways those assets can be distributed to members ² evidenced by the asset stripping at BHS and 
the huge dividends paid to the Green family when Arcadia group assets were revalued. It also 
inhibits share buyback schemes, as the dividend cap applies to all distributions to shareholders. 
The CIC asset lock, therefore, goes some way to protect the long-term viability of the business.  
Responsibility for encouraging stakeholder governance and fostering community connections 
falls primarily to CICs themselves. However, the Regulator (and her office) play a significant role 
in supporting this by reporting case studies in publicly available annual reports which highlight 
benefits to the community from CIC activity and their different methods in engaging stakeholder 
involvement.  
The legal form of the CIC therefore provides some useful attributes in the advancement of 
responsible capitalism. It provides some protection of the corporate assets, reduces the 
incentives to pursue shareholder value and requires the company to have a purpose beyond 
profit making, and which must be specifically identified as being in the interest of the 
community.   
Equally, though, these attributes are undermined by broader market imperatives. For example, 
the efficacy of the dividend cap has been reduced since its initial introduction precisely because it 
was unattractive to investors. Initially the regulations allowed the company to distribute 35% of 
distributable profits in any year, provided that amount did not exceed 5% above the Bank of 
(QJODQG·VEDVH UDWH IRUHDFKSDLGXS VKDUH However, the Regulator has the authority to set a 
new share dividend cap, aggregate cap or interest cap, subject to the approval of the Secretary of 
State,112 which has been exercised to downgrade the cap. Concern by the Regulator that the CIC 
was not performing its hybrid purpose of providing an alternative to the profit driven company, 
evidenced by the fact that less than one quarter of CICs were registered as limited by shares,113 
                                                          
112 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004, 22(3). The Regulator may 
from time to time, with the approval of the Secretary of State, set a new share dividend cap, 
aggregate dividend cap, or interest cap  
113 BIS, Changes to the Dividend and Interest Caps for Community Interest Companies Community 
Interest Companies: Response to the CIC consultation on the dividend and interest caps, 
(CIC/13/1333, 2013) 
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led to a consultation report which found that most CICs disliked the complexity of the double 
limits and desired the possibility of offering higher distributions. Accordingly, the consultation 
report recommended that the maximum dividend per share be removed, retaining only the 
maximum aggregate of profit that can be declared as a dividend. 114 This partial inroad into the 
dividend cap to satisfy investors is just one indication that CICs might morph into shareholder 
value companies to remain competitive. But this is not isolated to CICs. The largest and arguably 
the best known and successful employee owned cooperative, the Mondragon Cooperative 
Group, 115  has also adopted corporate strategies in order to remain profitable. These have 
included reducing wages, introducing more wage labour (as opposed to owner workers) and off-
shoring work to developing countries, in much the same way as global corporations.116  This is 
discouraging for those who view alternative business forms as the panacea to irresponsible 
capitalism but is indicative of the overwhelming constraints on responsible capitalist 
organisations within global capitalism.  
Furthermore, when establishing CICs, the government preferred to make their stakeholding 
DWWULEXWHVVXEMHFW WRDVRIW ODZDSSURDFK7KLV LVHFKRHG LQWKHFXUUHQWJRYHUQPHQW·VYLHZWKDW
regulatory overview is effective but ¶OLJKWWRXFK·.117 The regulator does not prescribe stakeholder 
engagement, although she does issue detailed guidance and engages in consultations with CICs in 
respect of the regulations in general.  
2. How successful is the Community Interest Company Model? 
While the CIC has been under a certain amount of pressure to become more market oriented, 
the question remains: has it been successful in making British capitalism more responsible?  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/264664/CIC-13-
1333-community-interest-companies-response-on-the-cic-consultation.pdf> checked 8 May 2018, 3  
114 Ibid 
115 Since its establishment in the 1950s, the Mondragon Group has grown to over 100 co-operative 
groups with over 80,000 employees and an annual turnover of over £10 billion 
116 ƌƌƐĂƚŝ ?/ƌĞƚŽƐĂŶĚƚǆĞǌĂƌƌĞƚĂ ? ‘tŚĂƚŽMondragon Coopitalist Multinationals Look Like? 
The Rise anĚ&ĂůůŽĨ&ĂŐŽƌůĞĐƚƌŽĚŽŵĠƐƚŝĐŽƐ^ ?ŽŽƉ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ^ƵďƐŝĚŝĂƌŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
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117 Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Annual Report 2016/17, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/630211/cic-17-
2community-interest-companies-annual-report-2016-2017.pdf> checked 8 May 2018  
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Advocates of the CIC point to its popularity, as over 13,000 CICs are currently registered and 
functioning.118  However, the real test of its transformative ability is whether the CIC is making 
business more aware of social issues and capitalism more responsible. We argue that neither is 
evidenced. Instead, the growth of CICs has been driven by small local initiatives that have always 
been present in some form or another, combined with the later addition of large health 
organisations created following government policy to devolve parts of the NHS to semi-private 
organisations. In the first three years of the Act, only 1,621 were formed but by March 2012 
there were 6,391 and the following year there were 7,670. The numbers have been increasing by 
around 1,500 a year until the latest figure of 13,055 in 2017. 119  This upward trajectory has 
occurred because the CIC became the ideal vehicle with which to devolve health services from 
the NHS.120 In 2008 a policy called Transforming Community Services was launched with the 
aim of devolving PRUHKHDOWKFDUHDZD\IURP3&7VWR¶WKHFRPPXQLW\·7KLVUHGXFHGWKHVHUYLFHV
that fell to the NHS and reduced the number of staff employed by the NHS.121 A significant and 
rising percentage (up by 6.0 per cent in 2011/12) of the NHS budget goes to care in a 
community setting, and this is organised through CICs: ¶WKH &,& LV LQFUHDVLQJO\ the standard 
structure for spin-outs from health, youth services, leisure and other public-sector areas, whose 
EXGJHWVFDQEHWHQVRIPLOOLRQVRISRXQGV·122 
The percentage of CICs which are registered as companies with shares is another indication that 
the CIC has been unable to make significant inroads into the dominance of the shareholder value 
company. This has remained at a near constant less than 25%123 (around 75% are limited by 
guarantee) and even those companies that do have shares rarely distribute dividends, despite the 
                                                          
118 ibid 
119 Ibid  
120 Health based CICs together with those in education, sports and the arts, dominate in terms of 
number of CICs and the wealth of the sector: ibid, 6 
121 ED:ŽŶĞƐĂŶĚŚĂƌůĞƐǁŽƌƚŚ ? ‘ƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨE,^ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞĂŶĚůĂďŽƵƌƉƌŽductivity: The 
ĂŶĂƚŽŵǇŽĨŚĞĂůƚŚƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?AMhttps://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/research/the-anatomy-of-
health-spending-2011-12-a-review-of-nhs-expenditure-and-labour-productivity> checked 8 May 
2018 
122 ^ƵƌŶĞ:ĂŵĞƐ ? ‘ŶĂůǇƐŝƐ PdŚĞƌŝƐĞĂŶĚƌŝƐĞŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?
<http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/analysis-rise-rise-community-interest-
companies/governance/article/1348096> checked 8 May 2018 
123 Regulator of Community Interest Companies (n117), 14: 29% were limited by shares in 2016, 
rising slightly to 23.5% in 2017 
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relaxation of dividend cap rules noted above. This indicates that these legal forms are not 
transforming capitalism ² ¶GRLQJJRRGZKLOHGRLQJZHOO· ² but are simply useful vehicles for state 
based activities (principally devolved from the NHS) and small community enterprises that 
previously used different legal forms.124 Capitalist business would appear to be remaining with 
the legal form that allows profit maximisation, the limited liability company.  Capitalism, 
therefore, remains firmly immune to responsible business forms.  
 
Conclusion:  
In this paper, we have demonstrated that irresponsibility within capitalism has intensified 
because, whilst companies are legally and factually distinct from their rentier shareholders, who 
have little interest in the long-term prosperity of the enterprise, those shareholders are treated as 
though they are owners. We showed that an economy oriented around the promotion of rentier 
shareholder interests is inherently irresponsible. However, we also showed that through the 
twentieth century, social responsibility in capitalism was fostered and supported by different 
combinations of management, by the state and by organised labour. We noted that, paradoxically, 
company law gave shareholders stronger control rights in the second half of the twentieth 
century. However, we showed that this did not have a significant impact on the social orientation 
of capitalism because of the dominance of social democracy. Indeed, it was not until the 1980s 
when the political shift toward free market individualism and shareholder interests that the 
impact of these legal changes became fully manifest.   
While these political changes were underway, there was little discussion about responsible 
capitalism or the social responsibilLWLHVRIEXVLQHVVZLWK)ULHGPDQ·VLGHRORJLFDOVWDQFHKROGLQJDQ
iron grip over policymakers. However, from the late 1980s the notion that companies could 
demonstrate social responsibility without state intervention gained traction. We have not here 
discussed the many manifestations and implications of this voluntary form of social 
responsibility. However, it is important to note that its effect is to place responsibility for 
curtailing capitalist irresponsibility with companies themselves, rather with than a democratically 
                                                          
124 Part of the reason why social entrepreneurs adopt the CIC form is that the structure comes with 
far less bureaucracy than, for example, charities. They also provide the entrepreneur with more 
freedom and control. Being a CIC also gives access to various sources of funding such as grants that 
are not available to regular limited companies. See E Stenslie,  ‘ŚĂŵĞůĞŽŶƐďǇůĂǁ ?ĂŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů
ŝŶƋƵŝƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŽŵƉĂŶǇŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?ĨŽƌƚŚĐŽŵing) 
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accountable government, or through active representative unions. Modern corporate social 
responsibility allows companies to define the scope of their responsibility and, by conducting PR 
campaigns, to manage the extent to which governments interfere in their activities.  
We have outlined the ways in which modern shareholder value-driven corporate capitalism was 
enabled by the way companies are regulated and governed. In particular, we noted that it is 
driven by a strategic alignment of shareholder and director interests which has skewed corporate 
decision-PDNLQJLQGLUHFWLRQVZKLFKLQKLELWLQQRYDWLRQUHGXFHSURGXFWLYLW\DQGGHFUHDVHODERXU·V
claim on national product.  We then concluded by canvassing a number of reforms which would 
reduce corporate irresponsibility and examined an already existing company form, the CIC, 
which specifically inhibits these tendencies and considered how far the CIC has positively 
impacted on business. It seems clear from the evidence that the CIC has not encouraged 
business to take a less shareholder value orientation. The availability of an alternative company 
form cannot alter the trajectory of capitalism per se. Instead the CIC has begun to adopt a more 
investor friendly regime. Its main use has been to accommodate the semi-privatization of the 
NHS, a further retreat from the welfare society.  
As Streeck argues, capitalism makes all social goals subservient to the goal of profit maximisation. 
To alter that trajectory requires mandatory changes to the company form so that capitalism is 
forced by law to be more responsible. The current limited liability company enables both 
shareholders and directors to maximise their self-interest, and this is not something that either 
group will relinquish voluntarily. Similarly, companies will only rarely respond to reputational or 
other social concerns by voluntarily changing their behaviour in a more socially responsible 
direction.  
There are, of course, limits to how much difference company law reform can make to the 
reduction of irresponsibility in capitalism. It is widely known that UK-based multinational 
corporate groups, like their counterparts elsewhere in the world, engage in aggressive tax 
planning, facilitated by multinational accountancy firms, using legal devices like transfers of 
intangibles and borrowing to ensure that profits arise in low-tax jurisdictions. 125 Moreover, the 
problem of corporate lobbying makes the process of law reform itself an arduous process.  
                                                          
125 OECD, Making Globalisation Work: Better Lives for All, Key Issues Paper, Meeting of the OECD 
Council at Ministerial Level, Paris, 7- ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ‘ŝƐĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƵƐĞ
of tax-advantageous jurisdictions by corporations to avoid taxes or shift profits and wealthy 
individuals to avoid or evade tax, preferential tax deals for particular companies and special 
arrangements for foreign investors to settle disputes, among other things ? ? 
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As a final observation, a responsible economy is one which distributes wealth fairly, produces the 
private goods people need to thrive, and preserves enough of the public goods upon which all 
depend. The reforms we suggest in this article would certainly reduce the pressure for short-term 
shareholder value and this may lead executives to distribute more corporate surplus to employees. 
Equally, it may not. To ensure fairer distribution, employees must act collectively to press their 
claims for higher wages. Absent the pull from labour, any push from management will not 
necessarily be toward increasing labour benefits. There are, of course, considerable challenges 
facing trade unions. Trade union membership is in severe decline, with less than 6 percent of the 
private sector and 12 per cent of public sector workers being union members.126 The radical 
FKDQJHVWRWKHODZVRQFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQIURPWKHVKDYHJUHDWO\GLPLQLVKHGXQLRQV·DELOLW\WR
take effective industrial action, while subsequent governments have continued the legislative 
diminishing of union power.127 The recent Trade Union Act 2016 introduces a number a new 
hurdles to industrial action. This includes the requirement that at least 50% of those members 
entitled to vote in a ballot should do so, and of those voting, a majority must have voted in 
favour before industrial action can take place128 ² a provision which meant a number of UCU 
members did not take part in the 2018 industrial action over pensions, in spite of huge support 
across the sector. 129  The orientation of work away from traditional structures including the 
                                                          
126 BEIS, Trade Union Membership 2016: Statistical Bulletin, May 2017, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/616966/trade-union-membership-statistical-bulletin-2016-rev.pdf checked 8 May 2018, 5-7 shows 
that trade union membership in the UK peaked in 1979 and, broadly speaking, has been declining 
ever since from more than 13m members in 1979 to just above 6.2m in 2016. The OECD Employment 
Outlook 2017, < http://www.oecd.org/els/oecd-employment-outlook-19991266.htm> checked 8 
May 2018, figure 4.2, shows a similar trend in other English-speaking and firm-level bargaining 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚĚĞŶƐŝƚǇŝƐŵƵĐŚŚŝŐŚĞƌĂŶĚŵŽƌĞƐƚĂďůĞŝŶEŽƌĚŝĐĂŶĚ ‘'ŚĞŶƚƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ďƵƚ
declining in Northern and Central European countries (Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland, 
Netherlands. In the UK, trade union density is far higher in the public sector than the private sector 
(ibid, figure 4.A.1.6), and far higher in public administration and social and personal services than in 
the good-producing and business services sectors (ibid, figure 4.A.1.5) 
127 J Elgar and R Simpson,  ‘The impact of the law on industrial disputes in the 1980s ? (1992) Centre 
for Economic Performance, < https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/cepcepdps/dp0104.htm> checked 
8 May 2018  
128 Trade Union Act 2016, s2 
129 University College Union, USS Industrial Action Ballot, Final Report, 19 January 2018, 
<https://www.ucu.org.uk/media/9091/USS-ballot-results---ranked-summary-
table/pdf/uss_ballotresults_summaryranked_jan18.pdf> checked 8 May 2018 
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growth of temporary work, 130  and the growing gig economy has made traditional forms of 
collective organisation more difficult. Indeed, some leading scholars in the field argue that 
changing work practices have effectively rendered collective action defunct.131  
Underpinning the legal and political structures which contain capitalism is the state of the 
economy itself. In the introduction, we noted that the period of high growth and profitability in 
the post war period allowed for a compromise between labour and capital in which labour 
claimed a higher percentage of GDP. However, when growth began to fall in the 1960s, leading 
to lower profits and industrial conflict by the 1970s, governments eventually had to choose 
between reducing labour rights and therefore labour·VFODLPRQWKHVXUSOXVor accepting lower 
returns for capital. They chose to champion capital, or, as they claimed, to protect business. By 
reducing labour share, making use of cheap international labour and increasing irresponsibility, 
capital was able to recover and thrive for the best part of three decades, at least until the global 
financial crisis.  Company law and theory has been complicit in this. However, the continued 
post-GFC reliance on cheap flexible labour, financialisation and diminished investment not only 
creates a more irresponsible capitalism, it creates a capitalism that defeats its own logic and 
denies its own creative destruction. In terms of productivity, global capitalism is in a state of 
terminal decline. According to the IMF, ¶The drop in total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
following the global financial crisis has been widespread and persistent across advanced, 
emerging, and low-income countries. And that decline³alongside weak investment in the case 
of advanced economies³has been the main contributor to output losses relative to pre-crisis 
                                                          
130 OECD Employment Outlook 2017 (n126), 128 notes that collective bargaining systems have been 
under pressure from technological and organisational changes, globalisation, the decline of 
manufacturing, flexible work, population ageing, policy changes, declining union membership and 
increasing individualisation of employment relationships. 
131 KVW ^ƚŽŶĞ ‘Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers without 
tŽƌŬƉůĂĐĞƐĂŶĚŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŵƉůŽǇĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?27 Berkeley Journal of Employment and 
Labor Law ?<st^ƚŽŶĞ ? ‘Flexibilisation, Globalisation and Privatisation: Three Challenges to Labor 
ZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶKƵƌdŝŵĞ ?
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trends·132 Despite a succession of more optimistic forecasts, the OBR recently reported near 
zero productivity growth in the UK economy for the last five years.133  
Any change in political will or any legal reform to effect responsibility will have to be made in 
the context of the slow growth, low productivity national and global economy. Hence, a 
responsible capitalism will have to be a much less profitable capitalism. Responsible capitalism is 
no longer a win-win choice. And, while company law reform remains central to the rehabilitation 
of capitalism to a state of responsibility, it is but one tear in the seamless web.  
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